The Book of War: The Military Classic of the Far EastThe Articles of Suntzu; The Sayings of Wutzu-1

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[Pg 1]

THE BOOK OF WAR

[Pg 2][Pg 3]

THE

BOOK OF WAR

THE MILITARY CLASSIC

OF THE FAR EAST

TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE BY

CAPTAIN E. F. CALTHROP, R.F.A.

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE ST., W.

1908

[Pg 4][Pg 5]

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

7

THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU

I. 

PRELIMINARY RECKONING

17

II. 

OPERATIONS OF WAR

20

III. 

THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

24

IV. 

THE ORDER OF BATTLE

28

V. 

THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS

31

VI. 

EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH

34

VII. 

BATTLE TACTICS

40

VIII. 

THE NINE CHANGES

44

IX. 

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS

47

X. 

GROUND

53

XI. 

NINE GROUNDS

58

XII. 

ASSAULT BY FIRE

67

XIII. 

THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES

70

THE SAYINGS OF WUTZU

INTRODUCTION

75

I. 

THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY

77

II. 

ESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY

85

III. 

CONTROL OF THE ARMY

93

IV. 

QUALITIES OF THE GENERAL

101

V. 

SUITING THE OCCASION

108

VI. 

ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS

116

[Pg 6][Pg 7]

THE BOOK OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

I

Written in the fifth century B.C., Suntzu

and Wutzu still remain the most celebrated

works on war in the literature of China.

While the chariot has gone, and weapons

have changed, these ancient masters have

held their own, since they deal chiefly with

the fundamental principles of war, with the

influence of politics and human nature on

military operations; and they show in a

most striking way how unchanging these

principles are.

When these books were written, China

was a conglomerate of principalities in

continual ferment. Personal ambition and[Pg 8]

intrigue, and not the wishes of the people,

were the main factors in these wars.

Patriotism, or a popular cause, could not,

therefore, be relied on to maintain the

moral of the levies. Instead of these, what

may be called the force of despair is pointed

out as the most powerful agent in giving

cohesion and energy to an army. The

general is urged to take a vigorous offensive;

and to act at a distance from his base,

where defeat means disaster, and where

desertion is minimised owing to the distance

from home. He should, in fact, burn his

boats before an action, or, in Chinese phrase,

act as one who removes the ladder from

under those mounted upon the roof.

On the other hand, every care must be

taken not to render the enemy desperate;

and, as an instance of this, Sun observes

that an opponent should on no account

be completely surrounded. A loop-hole of

escape weakens the resolution of the general

and the energy of his troops.

It is interesting to notice that moral, or

the spirit of the troops, is thus considered[Pg 9]

a determining factor in war. The Chinese

are perhaps unusually affected by climatic

conditions. As is well known, the umbrella

was part of a soldier’s equipment; and for

the same reasons, the sunny side of high

ground is recommended as most suitable for

defence, tactical considerations permitting.

The large number of bannermen in the

Chinese army was out of all proportion to

the service of standards in providing rallying

points. The chief use of banners was to

maintain the spirit of the troops. A forest

of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of

liveliness and security to the ranks, in the

same way as a military band, and when

Sun remarks that the march of an army

should be calm like the forest, he is using

a simile that is not inappropriate.

Probably owing to the fact that the

profession of arms has never been highly

regarded in China, we find that the ruler

of the state did not usually take the field,

but employed a professional to command

the army—one of the masters of war who

wandered from state to state at that time[Pg 10]

with the secrets of victory to impart to the

highest bidder. The question of political

interference with the general in the field

naturally arises under these conditions.

The two sages point out, that to unite the

nation under firm and just government is

the business of the ruler and necessary to

victory; but that the general is the best

judge of the questions that arise on a

distant field, and that all interference with

him causes delay and disaster.

War meaning ravage, it was essential

that the operations should be conducted

in the enemy’s territory. Once there, however,

a vigorous offensive is no longer

advised. “At first behave with the discretion

of a maiden” is the counsel of Sun.

The enemy must be induced to take the

initiative, and when he is worn out by

marching, or makes a false move, “then,”

says the master, “dart in like a rabbit.”

Unlike the tactics of the Japanese, in

whom the spirit of attack burns so strongly,

those of Suntzu and Wutzu are essentially

of the offensive-defensive order—manœuvre[Pg 11]

before fighting, and non-committal until the

enemy has shown his hand. The business

of the general is to avoid encounter in

battle until the enemy is no longer capable

of offering a successful resistance.

The masters do not make, however, the

mistake of advocating a passive defensive.

Suntzu lays down that the division of the

forces which this strategy involves, is to

be everywhere weak, rendering the army

liable to be taken in detail by the concentrated

forces of the enemy. It is rather the

defence which avoids battle by mobility

and manœuvre, induces the enemy by

stratagem to divide his forces, or act in

conformity with our wishes, and then falls

upon him.

With regard to the tactics of the battlefield,

the pitched battle, or, in other words,

the frontal attack, is considered unworthy

of the skilful general. The plan of attack

should consist, broadly speaking, in the

division of the army into two forces. The

enemy is “attracted and engaged by one

force, and defeated with the other;” and[Pg 12]

here we have the containing or secondary

attack, and the main or reserve force

which decides the battle of to-day—a

most striking instance of the continuity of

military principles.

Considerable space is devoted to the

influence of ground on war. The passage

of defiles and rivers is still conducted in

the same way. The many large rivers

of China naturally affected military operations;

and, among other axioms, it is laid

down that the passage of a river should

not be disputed, as the enemy will probably

give up the attempt, and make the passage

untouched at some other point, but that

he should be attacked when half his force

is across the stream. Again, an army should

not encamp on a river below the enemy,

as it is thereby liable to be inundated, or to

have its water poisoned; or the enemy may

come down stream and make a sudden

attack.

While both writers were professional

soldiers, they show a fine disinterestedness

by repeatedly pointing out that even[Pg 13]

successful war brings evil in its train.

Wu remarks that “few are those who have

gained power on earth by many victories,”

and he is insistent that war should not be

undertaken until a careful comparison of

the two sides shows that victory is certain;

and he adds, “The army which conquers

makes certain of victory and then attacks,

while the army that is defeated fights in

the hope of success.”

Hence the importance they assign to

intelligence of the enemy, and to the spy;

and as the sages dealt with war between

members of the same race, the work of

spies was greatly facilitated. The spy was

treated with great honour by his countrymen,

and the fact that many of the national

heroes of China were spies, shows that the

part that they played was not forgotten.

They frequently toiled for years, and rose

to high rank in the enemy’s service; and

thus, by wrong counsel and by spreading

mistrust in his ranks, they became a two-edged

sword in the hands of the general.

“Wonderful, indeed, is their power,”[Pg 14]

exclaims Sun; but he also reminds us that

their management is the most difficult and

delicate duty of the general.

II

Sun and Wu are perhaps held in even

greater reverence in Japan than in China,

where war is looked upon as a troublesome

phase in national life, and victory in battle

is not considered the greatest achievement

of a state. Far otherwise is it in Japan;

and successive generations of her soldiers

have been brought up on Sun and Wu.

Like other arts, mystery was formerly supposed

to surround the art of war, a belief

that was encouraged by the strategist; and

for a considerable time, the few copies of

this book, that were brought over from

China to Japan, were jealously guarded

by their possessors. Later, as they became

known, an army of Japanese commentators

arose—for Chinese literature is thought

compressed, to be unfolded in the mind

of the reader.

[Pg 15]

To-day Sun and Wu have given way to

the scientific works of European writers,

but their sayings have become proverbs,

and their influence undoubtedly helped the

Japanese to victory in the late war. Belief

in the importance of a knowledge of the

enemy and his resources, of preparation and

training, had grown out of a long study

of these ancient masters; and since it was

the vital importance of a successful issue

to the Japanese which, after all, fired their

resolution and carried them through, they

proved the sage’s words that it is the energy,

born of despair, that wins the victory.

III

Little is known of the life of either

master. They were in no sense patriots but

professional strategists, continually changing

their employer. Chinese history tells a

famous story about Sun. A certain ruler

asked Sun to give a practical demonstration

of his principles in the neighbourhood

of the palace, and entrusted him with[Pg 16]

the women of the court for this purpose.

During the operations, the leader of one

of the sides did not obey the master’s

instructions, and her execution was ordered.

She happened to be the king’s favourite

wife, but Sun pointed out that the king’s

wish that her life should be spared was

a case of political interference with the

general in the field; and the sentence was

carried out.

Wu is represented as a person of low

moral character. On two separate occasions,

for fear of giving rise to suspicion, he killed

one of his wives who belonged to a state

with which his employer at the time was

at war; and, graver still in the eyes of

the Chinese historian, he was not present

at the death-bed of his mother.

E. F. C.

NOTE.

The translator is indebted to Major J. C. Somerville

for his kind help and criticism.

[Pg 17]

THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU

I

PRELIMINARY RECKONING

The words of Sun the Master:—

To all nations War is a great matter.

Upon the army death or life depend: it is

the means of the existence or destruction

of the State.

Therefore it must be diligently studied.

Now, in war, besides stratagem and

the situation, there are five indispensable

matters. The first is called The Way;[1]

the second, Heaven; the third, Earth; the

fourth, the Leader; the fifth, Law.

The Way or the proper conduct of man.

If the ruling authority be upright, the

people are united: fearless of danger, their

lives are at the service of their Lord.

[Pg 18]

Heaven. Yin and Yang;[2] heat and

cold; time and season.

Earth. Distance; nature; extent;

strategic position.

The Leader. Intelligence; truth; benevolence;

courage and strictness.

Law. Partition and ordering of troops.

These things must be known by the

leader: to know them is to conquer; to

know them not is to be defeated.

Further, with regard to these and the

following seven matters, the condition of

the enemy must be compared with our own.

The seven matters are:—

The virtue of the prince; the ability

of the general; natural advantages; the

discipline of the armies; the strength of

the soldiers; training of the soldiers;

justice both in reward and punishment.

Knowing these things, I can foretell the

victor.

[Pg 19]

If a general under me fight according

to my plans, he always conquers, and I

continue to employ him; if he differ from

my plans, he will be defeated and dismissed

from my service.

Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing,

considering that with us lies the advantage,

and the generals agreeing, we create a

situation which promises victory; but as

the moment and method cannot be fixed

beforehand, the plan must be modified

according to circumstances.

War is a thing of pretence: therefore,

when capable of action, we pretend disability;

when near to the enemy, we

pretend to be far; when far away, we

pretend to be near.

Allure the enemy by giving him a small

advantage. Confuse and capture him. If

there be defects, give an appearance of

perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend

to be strong, and so cause the enemy to

avoid you. Make him angry, and confuse

his plans. Pretend to be inferior, and

cause him to despise you. If he have[Pg 20]

superabundance of strength, tire him out;

if united, make divisions in his camp.

Attack weak points, and appear in unexpected

places.

These are the secrets of the successful

strategist, therefore they must not be made

known beforehand.

At the reckoning in the Sanctuary before

fighting, victory is to the side that excels

in the foregoing matters. They that have

many of these will conquer; they that

have few will not conquer; hopeless,

indeed, are they that have none.

If the condition of both sides with regard

to these matters be known, I can foretell

the victor.

II

OPERATIONS OF WAR

Sun the Master said:—

Now the requirements of war are such

that we need a thousand light chariots with

four horses each; a thousand leather-covered[Pg 21]

chariots, and one hundred thousand armoured

men; and we must send supplies to distant

fields. Wherefore the cost at home and in

the field, the entertainment of guests, glue

and lacquer for repairs, and necessities for

the upkeep of waggons and armour are such

that in one day a thousand pieces of gold

are spent. With that amount a force of

one hundred thousand men can be raised:—you

have the instruments of victory.

But, even if victorious, let the operations

long continue, and the soldiers’ ardour decreases,

the weapons become worn, and, if

a siege be undertaken, strength disappears.

Again, if the war last long, the country’s

means do not suffice. Then, when the

soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted,

strength gone and funds spent, neighbouring

princes arise and attack that weakened

country. At such a time the wisest man

cannot mend the matter.

For, while quick accomplishment has been

known to give the victory to the unskilful,

the skilful general has never gained

advantage from lengthy operations.

[Pg 22]

In fact, there never has been a country

which has benefited from a prolonged war.

He who does not know the evils of war

will not reap advantage thereby. He who

is skilful in war does not make a second

levy, does not load his supply waggons thrice.

War material and arms we obtain from

home, but food sufficient for the army’s

needs can be taken from the enemy.

The cost of supplying the army in distant

fields is the chief drain on the resources of

a state: if the war be distant, the citizens

are impoverished.

In the neighbourhood of an army prices

are high, and so the money of the soldiers

and followers is used up. Likewise the

state funds are exhausted, and frequent

levies must be made; the strength of the

army is dissipated, money is spent, the

citizen’s home swept bare: in all, seven-tenths

of his income is forfeited. Again,

as regards State property, chariots are

broken, horses worn out, armour and

helmet, arrow and bow, spear, shield, pike

and fighting tower, waggon and oxen used[Pg 23]

and gone, so that six-tenths of the Government’s

income is spent.

Therefore the intelligent general strives

to feed on the enemy; one bale of the

enemy’s rice counts as twenty from our

own waggons; one bundle of the enemy’s

forage is better than twenty of our own.

Incitement must be given to vanquish

the enemy.

They who take advantage of the enemy

should be rewarded.

They who are the first to lay their hands

on more than ten of the enemy’s chariots

should be rewarded; the enemy’s standard

on the chariots exchanged for our own; the

captured chariots mixed with our own

chariots and taken into use.

The accompanying warriors must be

treated well, so that, while the enemy is

beaten, our side increases in strength.

Now the object of war is victory; not

lengthy operations, even skilfully conducted.

The good general is the lord of the

people’s lives, the guardian of the country’s

welfare.

[Pg 24]

III

THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

Sun the Master said:—

Now by the laws of war, better than

defeating a country by fire and the sword,

is to take it without strife.

Better to capture the enemy’s army intact

than to overcome it after fierce resistance.

Better to capture the “Lu,”[3] the “Tsu”

or the “Wu” whole, than to destroy them

in battle.

To fight and conquer one hundred times

is not the perfection of attainment, for the

supreme art is to subdue the enemy without

fighting.

Wherefore the most skilful warrior outwits

the enemy by superior stratagem; the

next in merit prevents the enemy from

uniting his forces; next to him is he who

engages the enemy’s army; while to besiege

his citadel is the worst expedient.

[Pg 25]

A siege should not be undertaken if it

can possibly be avoided. For, before a

siege can be commenced, three months are

required for the construction of stages,

battering-rams and siege engines; then a

further three months are required in front

of the citadel, in order to make the

“Chuyin.”[4] Wherefore the general is

angered, his patience exhausted, his men

surge like ants against the ramparts before

the time is ripe, and one-third of them are

killed to no purpose. Such are the misfortunes

that sieges entail.

Therefore the master of war causes the

enemy’s forces to yield, but without fighting;

he captures his fortress, but without

besieging it; and without lengthy fighting

takes the enemy’s kingdom. Without tarnishing

his weapons he gains the complete

advantage.

This is the assault by stratagem.

[Pg 26]

By the rules of war, if ten times as strong

as the enemy, surround him; with five

times his strength, attack; with double his

numbers, divide. If equal in strength,

exert to the utmost, and fight; if inferior

in numbers, manœuvre and await the opportunity;

if altogether inferior, offer no chance

of battle. A determined stand by inferior

numbers does but lead to their capture.

The warrior is the country’s support. If

his aid be entire, the country is of necessity

strong; if it be at all deficient, then is the

country weak.

Now a prince may embarrass his army in

three ways, namely:—

Ignorant that the army in the field should

not advance, to order it to go forward; or,

ignorant that the army should not retreat,

order it to retire.

This is to tie the army as with a string.

Ignorant of military affairs, to rule the

armies in the same way as the state.

This is to perplex the soldiers.

Ignorant of the situation of the army, to

settle its dispositions.

[Pg 27]

This is to fill the soldiers with distrust.

If the army be perplexed and distrustful,

then dangers from neighbouring princes

arise. The army is confounded, and offered

up to the enemy.

There are five occasions when victory can

be foretold:—

When the general knows the time to

fight and when not to fight; or understands

when to employ large or small numbers;

when government and people are of one

mind; when the state is prepared, and

chooses the enemy’s unguarded moment for

attack; when the general possesses ability,

and is not interfered with by his prince.

These five things are the heralds of

victory.

It has been said aforetime that he who

knows both sides has nothing to fear in a

hundred fights; he who is ignorant of the

enemy, and fixes his eyes only on his

own side, conquers, and the next time is

defeated; he who not only is ignorant of

the enemy, but also of his own resources,

is invariably defeated.

[Pg 28]

IV

THE ORDER OF BATTLE

Sun the Master said:—

The ancient masters of war first made

their armies invincible, then waited until

the adversary could with certainty be

defeated.

The causes of defeat come from within;

victory is born in the enemy’s camp.

Skilful soldiers make defeat impossible,

and further render the enemy incapable

of victory.

But, as it is written, the conditions

necessary for victory may be present,

but they cannot always be obtained.

If victory be unattainable, we stand

on the defensive; if victory be sure, we

attack.

Deficiency compels defence; super-abundance

permits attack.

The skilful in defence crouch, hidden[Pg 29]

in the deepest shades; the skilful in attack

push to the topmost heaven.[5]

If these precepts be observed, victory is

certain.

A victory, even if popularly proclaimed

as such by the common folk, may not be

a true success. To win in fight, and for

the kingdom to say, “Well done,” does

not mark the summit of attainment. To

lift an autumn fleece[6] is no proof of

strength; the eyes that only see the sun

and moon are not the eagle’s; to hear the

thunder is no great thing.

As has been said aforetime, the able

warrior gains the victory without desperate

and bloody engagements, and wins thereby

no reputation for wisdom or brave deeds.

To fight is to win, for he attacks only when

the enemy has sown the seeds of defeat.

Moreover, the skilful soldier in a secure

position does not let pass the moment

when the enemy should be attacked.

[Pg 30]

The army that conquers makes certain of

victory, and then seeks battle.

The army destined to defeat, fights,

trusting that chance may bring success to

its arms.

The skilful leader is steadfast in the

“Way”; upholds the Law, and thereby

controls the issue.

Touching the laws of war, it is said: first,

the rule; second, the measure; third, the

tables; fourth, the scales; fifth, the foretelling

of victory.

For the rule is the survey of land; the

measure tells the amount of that land’s

produce; the tables its population; from

the scales their weight or quality is made

known; and then can we calculate victory

or defeat.

The army that conquers as against the

army destined to defeat, is as a beam

against a feather in the scales. The attack

of conquering forces is as the outburst of

long-pent-up waters into sunken valleys.

Such are the orders of battle.

[Pg 31]

V

THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS

Sun the Master said:—

The control of large numbers is possible,

and like unto that of small numbers, if we

subdivide them.

By means of drum, bell and flag,[7] the

direction of large forces in battle is possible,

and like unto the direction of small forces.

By the skilful interchange of normal and

abnormal manœuvres are the armies certainly

preserved from defeat.

The enemy is crushed, like the fall of a

grindstone upon an egg, by knowledge of

his strength and weakness, and by the

employment of truth and artifice.

Moreover, in battle the enemy is engaged[Pg 32]

with the normal and defeated by the

abnormal force.[8]

The abnormal force, skilfully handled,

is like the heaven and earth, eternal;

as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing;

like the sun and moon, for ever

interchanging; coming and passing, as the

seasons.

There are five notes; but by combinations,

innumerable harmonies are produced.

There are but five colours; but if we mix

them, the shades are infinite. There are

five tastes, but if we mix them there

are more flavours than the palate can

distinguish.[9]

In war there are but two forces, the

normal and the abnormal; but they are

capable of infinite variation. Their mutual

interchange is like a wheel, having neither

beginning or end. They are a mystery

that none can penetrate.

[Pg 33]

As the rush of rock-shouldering torrents,

so is the spirit of the troops.

Like the well-judged flight of the falcon,

in a flash crushing its quarry, so should the

stroke be timed.

Wherefore the spirit of the good fighter

is terrifying, his occasions sudden; like the

stretched cross-bow, whose string is released

at the touch of the trigger.

In the maze and tumult of the battle,

there is no confusion; in the thick of action

the battle array is impenetrable.

If discipline be perfect, disorder can be

simulated; if truly bold, we can feign fear;

if really strong, we can feign weakness.

We simulate disorder by subdivision;

fear, by spirit; weakness, by battle formation.

We set the enemy in motion by adopting

different formations to which he must

conform.

If we offer the enemy a point of

advantage, he will certainly take it: we

give him an advantage, set him in motion

and then fall upon him.

[Pg 34]

Wherefore the good fighter seeks victory

from spirit, and does not depend entirely

upon the skill of his men. He is careful

in his choice, and leaves the rest to battle

force; yet, when an opening or advantage

shows, he pushes it to its limits.

As a log or rock which, motionless on

flat ground, yet moves with ever-increasing

force when set on an incline, so await the

opportunity, and so act when the opportunity

arrives.

If the general be skilful, the spirit of his

troops is as the impetus of a round stone

rolled from the top of a high mountain.

VI

EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH

Sun the Master said:—

To be the first in the field, and there to

await the enemy, is to husband strength.

To be late, and hurrying to advance to

meet the foe, is exhausting.

[Pg 35]

The good fighter contrives to make the

enemy approach; he does not allow himself

to be beguiled by the enemy.

By offering an apparent advantage, he

induces the enemy to take up a position

that will cause his defeat; he plants obstructions

to dissuade him from acting in

such a way as to threaten his own dispositions.

If the enemy be at rest in comfortable

quarters, harass him; if he be living in

plenty, cut off his supplies; if sitting

composedly awaiting attack, cause him to

move.

This may be done by appearing where

the enemy is not, and assaulting unexpected

points.

If we go where the enemy is not, we may

go a thousand leagues without exhaustion.

If we attack those positions which the

enemy has not defended, we invariably take

them: but on the defence we must be

strong, even where we are not likely to

be attacked.

Against those skilful in attack, the enemy[Pg 36]

does not know where to defend: against

those skilful in defence, the enemy does

not know where to attack.

Now the secrets of the art of offence are

not to be easily apprehended, as a certain

shape or noise can be understood, of the

senses; but when these secrets are once

learnt, the enemy is mastered.

We attack, and the enemy cannot resist,

because we attack his insufficiency; we

retire, and the enemy cannot pursue,

because we retire too quickly.

Again, when we are anxious to fight, but

the enemy is serenely secure behind high

walls and deep moats; we attack some

such other place that he must certainly

come out to relieve.

When we do not want to fight, we

occupy an unfortified line; and prevent the

enemy from attacking by keeping him in

suspense.

By making feints, and causing the enemy

to be uncertain as to our movements, we

unite, whilst he must divide.

We become one body; the enemy being[Pg 37]

separated into ten parts. We attack the

divided ten with the united one. We are

many, the enemy is few, and in superiority

of numbers there is economy of strength.

The place selected for attack must be

kept secret. If the enemy know not

where he will be attacked, he must prepare

in every quarter, and so be everywhere

weak.

If the enemy strengthen his front, he

must weaken his rear; if he strengthen

his right, his left is weakened; and if he

strengthen his left, his right is weakened.

Everywhere to make preparations, is to be

everywhere weak. The enemy is weakened

by his extended preparations, and we gain

in strength.

Having decided on the place and day

of attack, though the enemy be a hundred

leagues away, we can defeat him.

If the ground and occasion be not known,

the front cannot help the rear; the left

cannot support the right, nor the right the

left, nor the rear the front. For on occasion,

the parts of the army are two score[Pg 38]

leagues apart, while a distance of four or

five leagues is comparatively close.

The soldiers of Wu[10] are less than the

soldiers of Yueh; but as superiority in

numbers does not of necessity bring victory,

I say, then, that we may obtain the victory.

If the enemy be many in number, prevent

him from taking advantage of his

superiority, and ascertain his plan of operations.

Provoke the enemy and discover

the state of his troops; feint and discover

the strength of his position. Flap the

wings, and unmask his sufficiency or insufficiency.

By constant feints and excursions,

we may produce on the enemy an

impression of intangibility, which neither

spies nor art can dispel.

The general makes his plans in accordance

with the dispositions of the enemy,

and puts his hosts in motion; but the

multitude cannot appreciate the general’s

intention; they see the signs of victory, but

they cannot discover the means.

[Pg 39]

If a victory be gained by a certain

stratagem, do not repeat it. Vary the

stratagem according to circumstances.

An army may be likened to water.

Water leaves dry the high places, and

seeks the hollows. An army turns from

strength and attacks emptiness.

The flow of water is regulated by the

shape of the ground; victory is gained by

acting in accordance with the state of the

enemy.

The shape of water is indeterminate;

likewise the spirit of war is not fixed.

The leader who changes his tactics in

accordance with his adversary, and thereby

controls the issue, may be called the God

of war.

Among the five elements[11] there is no

settled precedence; the four seasons come

and go; the days are long and short; and

the moon waxes and wanes. So in war

there is no fixity.

[Pg 40]

VII

BATTLE TACTICS

Sun the Master said:—

For the most part, military procedure

is as follows:—

The general receives orders from his

lord; assembles and settles harmony

among the forces, and takes the field.

There is nothing more difficult than

Battle Tactics. Their difficulty lies in the

calculation of time and distance, and the

reversal of misfortune.

To make the enemy take a circuitous

route by a show of gain, and then, whilst

starting after him, to arrive before him, is

to be a master of the art of manœuvre.

The operations of an army may reap

advantage; the wrangles of a multitude

are fraught with peril.

Employing our whole force at one time

in order to gain advantage over the enemy,[Pg 41]

we may not have time enough to gain our

object. If we push on with a portion of the

force only, the transport is lost. Discarding

helmet and armour; stopping neither day

nor night; marching double distance; doing

double work; and finally contending with

the enemy at a distance of a hundred

leagues: results in the loss of the general.

Since the strong men arrive first, and the

tired drop in rear, only one-tenth of the

forces is available.

A forced march of fifty leagues to secure

an advantage may result in failure to the

leader of the vanguard, for only half his

men will arrive.

After a forced march of thirty leagues

to secure an advantage, only two-thirds of

the army will be available.